When President Donald Trump first pitched his plan for post-war Gaza during a joint news conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier this month, it was difficult to parse whether it was just one of his many off-the-cuff remark or a real recommendation. Expelling more than 2 million Palestinians into Jordan and Egypt, transforming Gaza into a U.S. territory as if it was the Middle East’s version of Puerto Rico and turning the war-battered enclave into a top-notch travel destination sounded too ridiculous and deluded to take seriously. Even Netanyahu looked surprised when Trump blurted out the idea.

Trump, however, kept coming back to it again and again. Over the ensuing days, he repeatedly insisted the U.S. would in effect take complete ownership of Gaza (without putting U.S. troops on the ground or spending taxpayer money, of course), that the Arab world’s major powers liked the plan and went as far as to suggest that the Palestinians might not be allowed back in once the all the resorts, hotels and golf courses were constructed.

Trump has since distanced himself from the entire scheme, expressing surprise that Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi and King Abdullah II of Jordan were so strongly opposed to it. In some ways, though, Trump’s Gaza plan (if you could call it that) was successful in at least one respect: it produced such shock, confusion and trepidation in the region that the Arab world’s major governments started getting their heads together to draft an alternative.

Last Friday, Feb. 21, delegations from Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates met in Riyadh for an emergency summit on precisely this topic. The questions were as straightforward as the technicalities were complicated: how should Gaza be governed and reconstructed after the Israel-Hamas war is over, without having to resort to ethnic cleansing? Who would be responsible for funding reconstruction, which the United Nations, European Union and World Bank assess will cost more than $53 billion over the next decade? And can the Arab states present a plan that Trump will support?

Last week’s meeting in Riyadh came and went without answers to any of these questions. The only thing the participants agreed on is that under no circumstances can Palestinians be pushed off their own land. Doing so would not only have dire repercussions under international law but would also be unworkable, since the states who would be expected to take them in — Egypt and Jordan — have their own self-interested reasons for not cooperating.

While discussions continue, one plan drafted by Egypt is getting most of the attention. Under this idea, Palestinians in Gaza would be designated three safe zones where they could live temporarily as donor-funded reconstruction efforts proceed over a period of five years (although this time frame rings overly optimistic ). Palestinian Authority security forces would be responsible for providing law and order, perhaps with the support and backup of an Arab intervention force. Gaza, in turn, would be run by a technocratic committee of Palestinians, without Hamas or Palestinian Authority involvement. The Egyptian-drafted scheme aims to achieve three goals simultaneously: rebuild Gaza, keep the peace and do both without displacing the inhabitants who call Gaza home. The Arab League may or may not put their stamp of approval on it during their next summit on March 4.

Trump’s utterings on Gaza had so many holes that you could drive a tractor trailer through them. Egypt’s version is far better in terms of feasibility but also runs into problems. Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates will be expected to pay most of the bill for Gaza’s reconstruction, which they’ve done before after past wars between Israel and Hamas. Yet you can’t blame these same states for not wanting to relive this endless cycle of destruction-and-reconstruction. Why throw tens of billions of dollars into Gaza if another war one, five or 10 years later could destroy whatever progress was made? The Arab states are also unlikely to order their own forces to participate in a post-war Gaza stabilization mission if it’s not connected to the establishment of a Palestinian state — or at the very least a guarantee that Israel and the Palestinian Authority will enter into final-status negotiations. The last thing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani wants to do is put themselves in the position of policing the Palestinians on Israel’s behalf.

Talk of stabilization and economic revitalization aside, it’s important to note that the entire conversation is irrelevant if the Israel-Hamas truce doesn’t hold up. The first six-week phase, which ends March 1, has worked well enough. Dozens of Israeli and foreign hostages have been freed, as have thousands of Palestinian prisoners. Gaza is now receiving humanitarian aid at a pace and scope it hasn’t seen since before the war began Oct. 7, 2023. There have been issues with implementation, delays in prisoner releases, inhumane public relations stunts by Hamas as well as accusations by Israeli and Hamas officials of violations. But the ceasefire deal negotiated by the Biden and Trump administrations has worked to stem the bleeding.

Even so, Phase 1 was always the easiest part of the three-stage process. Phase 2, where Israel and Hamas are expected to negotiate the return of all remaining hostages as well as the permanent end to the war, is what will ultimately determine whether Gaza sees peace or continued conflict. Nearly three weeks past the deadline, those talks have yet to start.

The Trump administration should be encouraging the Arab world to take primary initiative over Gaza. But unless the war actually stops, none of the post-war planning will amount to much.

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Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.

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